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a b s t r a c t
Due to the importance of gaining high levels of customer satisfaction in today’s competitive world, mak-
ing appropriate decisions in the face of malicious attacks is valued highly by many organizations. In this
paper, to predict and handle the destructive effects of an intentional attack on capacitated nested hierar-
chical facilities, a bi-level partial interdiction problem is proposed. In this problem, there is an interdictor
who can attack facilities partially in different levels. Subsequently, the system defender could respond to
the customers’ demand in two different ways, namely through the remaining system facilities and the
outsourcing option. The goal of the defender is to minimize the satisfaction cost of all customers’ de-
mand under the interdictor’s attacking scenario. This problem can be modeled as a bi-level programming
model in which an interdictor and the system defender play the role of the leader and the follower, re-
spectively. Due to the inherent complexity of the bi-level programming models, we develop a heuristic
approach, namely “FDS”, to obtain near optimal solutions within a reasonable running time. In each iter-
ation of the FDS, an interdiction scenario is produced heuristically and, thereupon CPLEX solver is called
to solve the lower level of the model. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed model, a comparison
between the cost of customers’ demand satisfaction in both absence and presence of the bi-level model is
drawn. Computational results show that for those instances in which the optimal solutions are available,
the proposed model can, on average, achieve a saving of 7.94%.


































Risk of disruption is an inherent element of supply chain op-
rations and depending on how prepared supply chains are, the
everity of the consequences varies. A study on 151 supply chains
eveals that 73% of these networks experienced disruptions over 7
ears between 2002 and 2007 (Kouvelis et al., 2011). Moreover, the
evel of globalization of a supply chain may significantly contribute
o the seriousness of the situation. Despite the widespread conse-
uences of such disruptions in the service and production sectors,
nd the fact that part of the witnessed disruptions affected supply
hains on a strategic level, most disruption risk management tools
re tailored for operational level risks (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005).
The literature categorizes the sources of disruption risks mainly
nto two groups, premeditated and random. In premeditated disrup-
ion, an intelligent attacker deliberately aims at causing a major
amage in a system’s performance. Labor strikes and terrorist at-∗ Corresponding author at: Industrial Engineering Department, Faculty of Engi-
eering, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad PO Box:91775-1111, Iran.
E-mail addresses: asefe.forghani@gmail.com (A. Forghani), f.dehghanian@um.ac.ir





305-0548/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.acks are examples of premeditated disruptions. In random disrup-
ion, however, the source of the risk is the nature, e.g. tsunami and
olcanic eruption (Azad et al., 2013).
The major difference between these two sources of risk is the
oncept of deliberateness and premeditation versus haphazard oc-
urrence (Church et al., 2004).
An overview of the literature reveals that the majority of the
esearchers have focused on the disruptions caused by the latter
ategory, i.e. random disruption risks (Aksen and Aras, 2012). This
s while studies show that since 2000 the proportion of the dis-
uptions caused by premeditated risks has dramatically increased
Chalk et al., 2005). One of the main reasons of this growth is the
ast and ongoing advancement in the information and communica-
ion technology which is misused by the attackers.
In this paper, we focus on disruptions caused by premeditated
isks in the service sector, and models to interdict such evaders, a
lass of problems that in the literature is defined as “interdiction
roblem”. Under such circumstances, “interdiction operations” are
lanned and run to prevent destructive attacks or minimize the
etrimental effect (Pub, 1997).



























































The primary motivation of interdiction problems is to assess the
vulnerability of a system from a combatant force’s perspective. The
output of these problems makes the critical facilities of the system
recognizable and may provide the system defender with appropri-
ate policies to prevent the occurrence of the most destructive at-
tacking scenario or mitigate its effects.
The application of interdiction problems is not limited to the
military sphere and by reinterpreting the outputs, we can bene-
fit from them even in the absence of the probability of any at-
tacks on system components. Under the random disruption risks,
this problem is able to warn the system designer about the worst
possible failure in the system. To corroborate the wide variety of
applications of interdiction problem, we refer to its utilization in
telecommunication networks (Rai and Soh, 1991), nuclear smug-
gling (Morton et al., 2007), conflict resolution (Anandalingam and
Apprey, 1991), supply networks (McMasters and Mustin, 1970),
protection of supply systems (Zhu et al., 2013), hospital infection
control (Assimakopoulos, 1987), critical infrastructure and key re-
sources (Murray and Grubesic, 2012), border controls (Pan, 2005),
electric grid security (Salmeron et al., 2004; Salmeron et al., 2009),
highway transportation (Durbin, 1966), and military and homeland
security (Lim and Smith, 2007).
The interdiction problem has a two-player game nature be-
tween an external enemy and a system defender. One of these
players is considered as the leader who makes decisions indepen-
dently and the other is considered as the follower whose deci-
sion is subordinated to the leader. Consequently, this problem pre-
dominantly is formulated as a bi-level optimization model whose
first formulation dates back to 1934 when it has been formu-
lated by Stackelberg in market economy (Dempe, 2002). The in-
terested readers may refer to useful studies on applications of bi-
level programming in interdiction problems which were carried
out byWood (2011) and DeNegre,(2011). Bi-level programming is
associated with inherent complexity and even the simplest cate-
gory of these problems, i.e. linear bi-level programming problem is
NP-hard (Jeroslow, 1985).
In this paper, inspired by many service systems, the facilities
structure is considered to be hierarchical. In a non-hierarchical sys-
tem all facilities provide the same service while, by contrast, in a
hierarchical system to serve customers with different services, sev-
eral levels of facilities are located. In a hierarchical system, facilities
consist of k levels where the highest level is called level k and the
lowest level is called level 1 (Şahin and Süral, 2007). Local clin-
ics, hospitals and medical centers are examples of a hierarchical
facility network in a healthcare system. At the lowest-level, the lo-
cal clinic provides direct services to incoming patients. A hospital,
at the middle level, provides services to local clinics and under-
takes out-patient surgeries. Finally, the medical center, at the high-
est hierarchy level, provides services to the hospital and responds
to in-patient cases (Zanjirani Farahani et al., 2014). There are a va-
riety of classification schemes for hierarchical systems. According
to the flow pattern attribute, facilities can be classified as single-
flow or multi-flow pattern. In single-flow pattern, the goods ship-
ment or customer’s path starts from the lowest level and ends at
the highest level or inversely. In multi-flow pattern, this restriction
is obviated and the flow can pass through any levels (Şahin and
Süral, 2007). Furthermore, both flow patterns can be segmented
into two categories: referral or non-referral. In a referral system, a
proportion of customers served at each level are referred to higher
levels, in contrast, in a non-referral system referral between lev-
els is considered impossible (Marianov and Serra, 2001). From ser-
vice varieties point of view, a hierarchical system can be classi-
fied as nested or non-nested according to the service availability at
the levels of the hierarchy. In non-nested facilities, each hierarchy
provides a different service, whereas in nested systems, an upper
level facility serves customers with all the services which a lowerevel facility can offer and at least one further service (Şahin and
üral, 2007).
In this paper, we study a partial interdiction problem on a ca-
acitated nested hierarchical service system. In full interdiction,
nterdicting a component of a vulnerable system causes total de-
truction, whereas partial interdiction of a system component does
ot necessarily cause a complete loss of its functionality .Consid-
ring hierarchical structure in a partial interdiction problem intro-
uces more complexity to the problem at hand since it increases
he number of possible interdiction patterns. To formulate this
roblem, we use bi-level programming. Finally, to solve the model,
e propose an enumeration algorithm and a heuristic procedure.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly re-
iews the relevant literature on interdiction problems. Definition
f the problem and its assumptions are presented in Section 3.
n Section 4, the mathematical formulation of the problem is
iven. The intricacies of the proposed heuristic solution proce-
ure for large-scale real-world problems are discussed in Section 5.
n Section 6, a two-stage enumeration solution procedure is pre-
ented. Computational experiments are conducted in Section 7, fol-
owed by some overall conclusions and recommendations for fu-
ure research in Section 8.
. Background
Interdiction problem models dates back to the early 1960s
Ramirez-Marquez and Rocco, 2009). In 1963, this problem named
nterdiction problem, for the first time (Wollmer, 1963). In that
ecade, Wollmer (1964), Durbin (1966) and Bellmore et al. (1967)
arried out the first attempts to implement interdiction models for
eal world problems and they analyzed the vulnerability of a trans-
ortation system to military attacks and disruptions. The last effort
n the decade, were made by Thomas and Models (1968) to offer
everal simple models for airstrikes.
The correspondence among these efforts is that all of them con-
ider that interdiction only occurs in arcs of a network and if an
rc is interdicted, its entire ability to serve customers will be lost.
his category is termed “network interdiction problem”. Construct-
ng a safer transportation system and preventing trafficking are
he primary motives for introducing this category of interdiction
roblem (Steinrauf, 1991). Objectives such as minimizing the max-
ow through a network, see, e.g. Wollmer (1964) and Burch et al.
2003), maximizing the shortest path, see e.g. Losada et al. (2012)
nd Israeli and Wood (2002), and minimizing the interdiction cost
f a network, see e.g. Nugent (1969) and Whiteman and Philip
1999), are the most frequent objective functions in the literature
f network interdiction problem. For example Smith et al. (2007)
enefit from building and fortifying network segments as a de-
ensive strategy against the various interdiction scenarios. It is as-
umed that the attacker has a specified budget to disable any por-
ion of arcs that are constructed on the network. More recently,
idgoli and Kheirkhah (2018) propose a bi-level mathematical pro-
ramming model for network interdiction vehicle routing problem.
n their model interdictor interdicts a subset of arcs using limited
esources and the distributor tries to maximize her/his profits in
he interdicted network.
In some cases in interdiction problem, the vulnerability of fa-
ilities in a network is examined. The category is named “facility
nterdiction”. The facility interdiction is first developed in 1982 by
orley and Sha (1982). In their proposed problem, the most vital
odes whose removal from the network causes the most elonga-
ion in the shortest distance between a source to a sink are iden-
ified.
Scaparra and Church (2012) study a service system that is
ormed from a set of capacitated facilities, which are vulnerable to
oth intentional and haphazard disruption risks. If a disaster oc-
















































































































urs in a facility, its capacity will be reduced and some customers
ay face unsatisfactory service level. Hence, to prevent the occur-
ence of the worst-case scenario, advanced fortification of the fa-
ilities to the extent that the defender’s resources allowed is sug-
ested. For this problem, a tri-level model is proposed. Losada et al.
2012) assume that when a facility faces partial interdiction, the
robability of its availability will be decreased. In partial interdic-
ion, interdicting a component of a vulnerable system does not
ecessarily leads to a complete loss of its functionality. Zhang et al.
2014) present the random attack median fortification problem and
he fortification median problem for disruptions caused by mixed
ypes of attacks.
Aksen et al. (2014) publish the study of partial interdiction on
median system. In this problem, the interdictor acts first and is
ble to destroy any portion of facilities capacity with regard to her
udget. Next, the defender acts and identifies the least-cost cus-
omer satisfaction pattern of all customers’ demand. There are two
ays of satisfying customers’ demand, namely through system fa-
ilities or outsourcing option. This problem is formulated as a bi-
evel model in which in the upper level the most destructive inter-
iction scenario is identified and in the lower level the defender
gures out the best customer satisfaction pattern.
Aliakbarian et al. (2015), for the first time, study the inter-
iction problem on a hierarchical system. This problem aims to
ortify the critical facilities of a service system in order to miti-
ate the worst-destructive scenario impacts. Fortified facilities are
ot vulnerable to attacks anymore. This problem is formulated as
bi-level optimization model. The system defender is the leader
f the problem and fortifies a specified number of facilities at
ach level. Subsequently, the interdictor, as the follower, chooses
he most destructive full interdiction scenario among unprotected
acilities. Since it is assumed that the facilities have infinite ca-
acities, in the lower level of the problem through closest as-
ignment constraints, the least-cost allocation pattern of satisfy-
ng all customers’ demand is identified. It means that the demand
t each customer zone is entirely supplied by the closest eligi-
le facility to that zone and if that facility is lost due to interdic-
ion, the demand is reassigned to the next closest eligible facility
mong the non-interdicted ones. Mahmoodjanloo et al. (2016) pro-
ide a tri-level defense facility location model and heuristic solu-
ion approaches for full coverage in r-interdiction median problem.
kbari-Jafarabadi et al. (2017) apply a tri-level facility location r-
nterdiction median based on bi-level programming.
More recently, Zhang et al. (2018) address the issue of decen-
ralized supply chain fortification by proposing the r-interdiction
edian problem with fortification for decentralized supply sys-
ems. Fathollahi Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli (2018) proposes a
i-objective, bi-level formulation for partial interdiction facilities
roblem considering different defensive systems.
Our paper is dedicated to the least common categories of
nterdiction problems (i.e. partial facility interdiction problems
Aksen et al., 2014)). For the first time, in this paper, partial in-
erdiction problem is studied on capacitated hierarchical facilities.
his study could be considered as a development of problems pro-
osed in Aksen et al. (2014) and Aliakbarian et al. (2015), hence
e provide the readers with the several important enhancements
n the assumptions of the most related part of the literature which
esult in more compatibility with real-world problems.
Aksen et al. (2014) present the most related problem to ours.
his paper is the first paper which examines a partial facility in-
erdiction on a median system. The authors assume that the in-
erdictor can result in any proportion of reduction in the capacity
f the system facilities. This assumption is far from reality; there-
ore, in this paper, we benefit from the concept of different inter-
iction intensity levels to resolve this issue. Here, the interdictor
an interdict facilities in discrete levels and these levels might beonsidered as the number of sorties or weapons which are avail-
ble for interdicting each facility. Another restrictive assumption
n Aksen et al. (2014) is how they satisfy the customers’ demand.
he authors presume each customer can be served only from one
ource, namely allocation to the system facilities or outsourcing,
nd if a customer benefits from the first source (i.e. allocation); all
f her demand must be satisfied through exactly one facility. This
ssumption has two drawbacks. Firstly, since this pattern incurs a
igh amount of cost and leaves some fraction of the system capac-
ty unused, most probably in real-world conditions the defender
oes not choose this pattern. In addition, in case that there are sev-
ral facilities for which the differences of their aggregate distances
rom a customer are negligible and their total capacity is sufficient
or satisfying the customer, it is not reasonable to allocate the cus-
omer to a far facility due to the insufficient capacity of each of
hese facilities. Hence, in this paper, we obviate these limitations
nd let the optimization model offer the optimal pattern.
In this paper, similar to Aliakbarian et al. (2015), we con-
ider a nested and referral hierarchical system. However, to
trengthen the conformity with reality, we consider that the facili-
ies are capacitated and excessive demand must be outsourced. In
liakbarian et al. (2015), the constraints on fortification and inter-
iction resources are cardinality constraints, i.e., a predetermined
umber of facilities in each level of the hierarchy can be attacked
nd hardened, while in real-world applications, for the sake of
exibility, these constraints are considered as budget constraints.
inally, in Aliakbarian et al. (2015) an expensive defensive strategy,
.e. fortification is applied in designing phase of the supply chain
etwork to deal with worst-destructive scenario. In our paper we
ropose two cheaper options to cope with the situation in which
he worst-destructive scenario happens, i.e. outsourcing and reas-
ignment.
The major features of our proposed problem can be summa-
ized as follows:
• The problem is classified as a partial facility interdiction prob-
lem.
• The system is median and the hierarchical facilities are nested
and referral.
• Interdiction occurs in discrete levels.
• The budget constraint is imposed on interdiction resources.
• The customers’ demand can be satisfied through allocating to
the system facilities or outsourcing.
• A customer can be allocated to more than one facility.
. Problem definition
This problem is studied on a region that is divided into smaller
ones. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the demand of
ach zone is concentrated at its center of gravity which is called
demand point” or “customer”. To satisfy the demand of the cus-
omers, several capacitated nested hierarchical facilities are located
n this region. Due to the nested nature of hierarchical facilities, a
acility at level II can provide both types of service with regard to
ts capacity, whereas for facilities at level I, the capacity for ser-
ice of type II is zero. By experience, it is known that the specific
roportions of demand of each customer are required particular
ervice levels, namely “type I” and “type II”. However, it can be
he case that a specific proportion of a customer’s demand, which
efers to a facility at level I or level II to receive service of type I,
eeds service of type II afterwards. We denote this service level by
referential type II”.
It is assumed that the cost of fulfilling customer’s demand
hrough allocation to available facilities is a function of the dis-
ance travelled, the service type, and the amount of demand. The
nit transportation costs for service of type I, type II, and referen-
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Fig. 1. An example of a vulnerable hierarchical service system.tial type II are respectively denoted by α, β and γ , where α < β
< γ in most real service systems.
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the allocation pattern of the customers to
the facilities of a service system before interdiction. This hierarchi-
cal system consists of eight demand points (numbered from 1 to
8) which are allocated to three facilities at level I (numbered from
9 to 11) and two facilities at level II (numbered 12 and 13) to re-
ceive service type I and II. Moreover, facilities 9 to 12 are allocated
to facility 13 to serve the proportion of their demand, which is in
need of the service of referential type II. However, for facility 13,
this proportion of demand is satisfied through self-referentiality.
In this problem, we assume that an interdictor can attack facil-
ities partially. The discrete levels of interdiction are denoted by k
and the reduction in the capacity of a facility at level I or II is a
linear function of its interdiction level. After interdiction, due to
the reduction in the capacity of the facilities, the system is not
able to serve the customers through the previous assignment pat-
tern. Therefore, the system defender benefits from two options: re-
assignment and outsourcing. The outsourcing cost is independent
of the travelled distance and is calculated through multiplying the
amount of outsourced demand by the outsourcing cost coefficient.
The outsourcing cost coefficients for service of type I, type II and
referential type II are indicated, respectively, by α′, β ′ and γ ′.
To promote clarity, see Fig. 1(b) which shows the hierarchal sys-
tem after interdiction. In this system, it is assumed that the inter-
dictor attack facilities at four levels (from 0 to 3). Facilities 9 and
11 are not interdicted (i.e. level 0), facilities 10 and 13 are inter-
dicted at level 1 and facility 12 is fully interdicted (i.e. level 3).
4. Bi-level formulation
To give a formal description of the developed model, some no-
tations and parameters are introduced as follows:
Sets:
I set of customers,
S1 set of existing facilities at level I,
S2 set of existing facilities at level II,
K set of different interdiction intensity levels.Transportation cost parameters:
α transportation cost from a customer to a facility at level I per
unit of distance,
β unit transportation cost from a customer to a facility at level II
per unit of distance,
γ unit transportation cost from a facility at level I to a facility at
level II per unit of distance,
Outsourcing cost parameters:
α′ unit outsourcing cost for service of type I,
β ′ unit outsourcing cost for service of type II,




cost of attack on a facility at level I at interdiction level k,
h2
k
cost of attack on a facility at level II at interdiction level k,
Demand-related parameters:
zi demand at customer i,
θ proportion of the demand that is referred to receive service of
type I,
σ proportion of the demand that is referred to receive service of
type II after receiving service of type I,
Interdiction budget and level parameters:
B total interdiction budget.




initial capacity of facility j for service of type I,
c2
j
initial capacity of facility j for service of type II,
d1
k




reduction ratio in capacity of a facility at level II after
interdiction at level k,
Distance parameters:
lij shortest distance between customer i and facility j,
l′
j f
shortest distance between facility j and facility f,




amount of demand of customer i that is allocated to facility j for
service of type I,
u2
i j
amount of demand of customer i that is allocated to facility j for
service of type II,
u3
j f
amount of demand of facility j that is referred to facility f to




amount of demand of customer i that is outsourced to receive
service of type I,
o2
i
amount of demand of customer i that is outsourced to receive
service of type II,











































































total amount of outsourced demand for referential service of
type II that is allocated to facility j,
Interdiction variables:
xjk binary variable, equal to one if facility j is interdicted at level k.















kx jk ≤ B (3)
jk ∈ {0, 1},∀ j ∈ S1, S2, k ∈ K (4)














































ubject to θzi =
∑
j∈S1,S2
u1i j + o1i ,∀i ∈ I (6)
(1 − θ )zi =
∑
j∈S2







u3j f + o3j ,∀ j ∈ S1, S2 (8)
i∈I u
1




k x̂ jk,∀ j ∈ S1 (9)
i∈I u
1


























i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I,∀ j ∈ S1, S2,∀ f ∈ S2 (12)
This model consists of two levels. At the upper level (i.e., (1)-
4)), the most destructive interdiction scenario is identified, while
t the lower level (i.e., (5)-(12)), the demand satisfaction pattern
s optimized. The interdictor’s objective function, as shown in (1),
s to maximize the minimum total demand satisfaction cost which
s shown in (5). In (2), choosing exactly one interdiction level, in-
luding level 0 (i.e. no interdiction), for each facility is enforced.
onstraint (3) restricts the interdiction budget. Constraints (4) en-
ure binary condition for the interdiction decision variables. The
efender’s objective function, which is shown in (5), is similar to
he attacker’s objective functions but in the opposite direction. The
rst three terms in the objective function indicate the cost of sat-
sfying customers’ demand through available facilities, whereas the
ext five terms show the cost of satisfying customers’ demand
hrough outsourcing. Constraints (6)-(8) guarantee that all the cus-
omers’ demand is met by the facilities in the network and/or out-
ourcing. Constraints (9)-(11) are facility-capacity constraints and
nforce choosing an allocation pattern which respects the capacity
onstraints after interdiction. Lastly, constraints (12) ensure non-
egativity condition for the defender’s decision variables.. Heuristic procedure
Since bi-level programming problems belong to the class of
P-hard problems (Jeroslow, 1985), in this section, we propose a
euristic procedure, called FDS, to find near optimal solutions for
arge-sized instances. FDS is decomposed into two stages, namely
1) the constructive stage in which an initial solution is built; and
2) the improvement stage where the solution is iteratively im-
roved through a local search procedure.
.1. Constructive stage (CS-FDS)
In this section, we propose two algorithms to obtain an initial
easible solution. The details of these constructive algorithms are
rovided in the following subsections.
.1.1. First constructive algorithm (CS1)
In order to build an initial solution, the facilities should be pri-
ritized. In the first constructive algorithm, the priority of a facil-
ty, from the interdictor point of view, is proportional to the total
eighted demand allocated to it in the absence of any attacks. We
ummarize the steps of the first constructive algorithm as follows:
Step 1:
Set xjk = 1 for all facilities at interdiction level k = 0 and xjk = 0
or other interdiction levels. Subsequently, solve the follower level







). Following this step, relations (13)-(15) give,
espectively, the aggregated demand of type I, type II and referen-

















u3∗f j,∀ j ∈ S2 (15)
Step 2:
Calculate the weighted demand allocated to each facility at
evel I and level II, respectively, through Eqs. (16) and (17). Note
hat in an equal condition, allocating a customer for service of type
to a facility at level I is preferred to allocating it to a facility at
evel II. Hence, for the facilities at level I, t1
j
is multiplied by the
arger coefficient (i.e., β) and for those facilities at level II, t1
j
is
ultiplied by the smaller coefficient (i.e., α).
j = β.t1j ,∀ j ∈ S1 (16)
j = α.t1j + β.t2j + γ .t3j ,∀ j ∈ S2 (17)
Step 3:
Sort the facilities in a descending order according to wj. Ties
re broken by giving higher priority to the facility with the lower
ndex.
Step 4:
Select the top priority facility and assign it the highest feasible
nterdiction level with regard to the interdiction budget. Then, up-
ate the residual interdiction budget and select the next top prior-
ty facility and continue the above-mentioned procedure until as-
igning an interdiction level (including level 0) to all available fa-
ilities.
.1.2. Second constructive algorithm (CS2)
In the second algorithm, we develop an innovative imaginary
nterpretation of this two-player game. In particular, the assump-
ion is that the interdictor and the defender agree to sign a peace























































treaty. This treaty forces the defender to give up some of her fa-
cilities to the interdictor. Obviously, according to the defender’s
objective function, she will give up the facilities with the lowest
priority. We name this problem as “Reverse interdiction problem”.
Reverse interdiction problem is formulated as a non-linear single-
level model. Since the application of this theoretical problem has
been limited to identifying the importance of the facilities, we re-
formulate it as a linear one. For this purpose, we assume a con-
tinuous interdiction instead of discrete interdiction intensity lev-
els. For this reformulation, some new notations must be defined.
In particular, rj shows the capacity fraction of facility j that is lost
with regard to this imaginary treaty. In addition, ϱ1 and ϱ2 are
two parameters which respectively show the cost of full interdic-
tion of a facility at levels I and II. Finally, B′ is the agreed price
in the peace treaty and the defender must give up her facilities
with regard to this parameter. In the reverse interdiction model,
the objective function, presented in (5), and constraints (6)-(8) and




















u3f j ≤ c2j − c2j r j,∀ j ∈ S2 (21)
0 ≤ r j ≤ 1,∀ j ∈ S1, S2 (22)
In this model, constraint (18) forces the defender to give up sev-
eral of her available facilities with regard to the agreed price (B′).
Modified capacities of the facilities for service of type I and type
II are shown in constraints (19)-(21). Constraints (22) impose the
required limit on the decision variables.
In the second constructive algorithm, to generate an initial solu-
tion, we benefit from the solution of the reverse interdiction prob-
lem. Essentially, this solution is an anti-ideal solution for the in-
terdictor with regard to her available budget. Therefore, from the
interdictor’s perspective, the priority of the facilities is in reverse
order of the solution obtained by the reverse interdiction problem.
Thus, the steps of the second constructive approach are summa-
rized as follows:
Step 1:
Set B′ = B and use CPLEX to solve the reverse interdiction prob-
lem. For each j ∈ S1,S2, set G j = r∗j in which r∗j is the optimal value
of the capacity proportion of facility j that is lost with regard to
the agreed price (B′). Note that the facilities which are submitted
at this agreed price are considered as the low priority facilities.
Step 2:
Set B′ = [(ϱ1 × |S1| + ϱ2 × |S2|) − B] and use CPLEX to solve the re-
verse interdiction problem. For each j ∈ S1,S2, set (G j = G j + r∗j ).
Note that those facilities which are not submitted at this agreed
price are considered as the high priority facilities.
Step 3:
Sort the facilities in an ascending order according to Gj. If Gj of
two facilities is the same, give higher priority to the facility with
the lower index.
Step 4:
Similar to step 4 of CS1.
5.2. Improvement stage (IS-FDS)
In this section, we propose a heuristic which aims at improving
the initial solution. The basic framework of the proposed heuristiclgorithm is presented in Section 5.2.1, followed by the detailed
escription of the search policies in next subsections.
.2.1. Basic framework of the heuristic algorithm
The proposed heuristic algorithm is composed of three polices.
he first policy (policy I) is called “elite-based policy”. This policy
xamines the neighborhood of the current interdiction pattern. In
ase of having an improvement in the objective function of the so-
ution, it substitutes for the current pattern. During this procedure,
matrix of elite attribute of the improved solutions is constructed.
his procedure continues until the stopping criterion of policy I is
et. When the termination criterion of policy I is met, policy II,
amely “diversification policy” is executed. The aim of this policy
s to try to escape from local optimal solution by perturbing the
olution. To do so, it will use the Elite matrix to guide the search
oward the regions which are not investigated by applying policy I.
xcept for the acceptance criterion, the search procedure in policy
II is similar to policy I. After running an iteration based on pol-
cy III, the stopping condition of the whole algorithm is checked. If
his criterion is met, the algorithm ends and the best solution is re-
orted. Otherwise, the acceptance criterion of policy III is checked.
n this policy, acceptance of a worse neighbor solution under a par-
icular condition is allowed with the purpose of encouraging the
lgorithm to change the neighborhood. Fig. 2 illustrates the basic
ramework of the proposed procedure.
.2.2. Policy I: elite-based policy
In this procedure, three different methods, namely, depth I,
epth II and depth III are introduced to generate a neighbor solu-
ion. The steps of constructing a neighbor solution through depth I
re explained as follows:
Step 1:
Initialize the residual budget of the current interdiction pattern
s[B − ∑ j∈S1 ∑k∈K h1kx jk + ∑ j∈S2 ∑k∈K h2kx jk], in which xjk is equal
o 1 if facility j is interdicted at level k in the current solution.
Step 2:
Select two facilities j′ and j′′at level I. Note that these facili-
ies are chosen based on “in-depth” strategies which are explained
ater. Following this selection, save their interdiction levels in k1
nd k2, respectively, and add their corresponding interdiction bud-






Select two interdiction levels k′ and k′′ that their aggregate in-
erdiction cost does not exceed R (i.e. R > h1
k′ + h1k′′ ) and assign
hem to the selected facilities. Since in policy I, “best improve-
ent” strategy is applied, all possible neighbor solutions for se-
ected facilities are constructed and the interdiction pattern which
aximizes the objective function (1) is accepted. As an example,
ee Fig. 3 in which facilities 1 and 2 from facilities at level I are
elected and two new feasible interdiction levels are assigned to
hem.
In depth II, the procedure of constructing a neighbor solution is
imilar to depth I except that both facilities are chosen from facili-
ies at level II.
The purpose of depth III is to encourage the algorithm to
hange the budget allocation contribution between both facilities
t levels I and II. In particular, selecting the same number of facili-
ies at each level most probably does not result in good neighbors.
ssume v1 and v2 are, respectively, the number of selected facili-
ies at levels I and II. In most cases, when the value of ϱ1v1 and
2v2 are almost the same, the search will reach to better results.
ence in this procedure, we suggest the values of v2 and v1 to be,
espectively, equal to 1 and
2
1
. For example, assume the cost of
ull interdiction of facilities at levels I and II are, respectively, equal
o 4000 and 11,000. Thus, through depth III, to construct a neigh-
or solution three facilities are selected from facilities at level I
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Fig. 2. Basic framework of the FDS algorithm.























nd one facility from facilities at level II. Other steps of the neigh-
orhood constructing procedure are similar to that of depths I and
I.
At the beginning of each iteration, the algorithm benefits from
long-term memory to select an appropriate depth with regardo its performance in prior iterations. The entrance probability to
ach depth is calculated through formula (23). In this relation, λ
s the counter of this learning procedure, ρ i counts the number of
ntrance to depth i and ηi counts the times that depth i improves
he best known solution. In addition, e is a weight that is con-
idered for entrance to each depth with equal probability. In early
terations, the historical data on the performance of each depth are
ot sufficient to decide which depth will result in a better neigh-
or structure. Hence, to improve the learning procedure an equal
robability for entering each depth (i.e., 13 × e) is considered. Over
ime, by increasing the corresponding value of λ, the impact of e



























) ; i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (23)
After selecting an appropriate depth through the learning pro-
edure, two different strategies, namely “in-depth” strategies, can
e used to decide upon the facilities which are selected for gener-
ting a neighbor solution. The probability of selecting facilities in
ach depth is modified based on the chosen in-depth strategy and
matrix, namely “Selection matrix”, is constructed with regard to
he current solution and the corresponding in-depth strategy.
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In depth I and II, the first in-depth strategy has a tendency to
choose one facility from those which are interdicted at high levels
and another from the facilities which are non-interdicted or inter-
dicted at low levels. However, the second in-depth strategy gives
priority to selecting two facilities from ones which are both inter-
dicted at high levels.
In depth III, through using the first in-depth strategy, there is a
tendency to choose facilities at level I which are interdicted at low
levels and one facility at level II which is interdicted at a high level.
However, in the second in-depth strategy an inverse approach is
applied.
In each depth, a short-term memory is applied to select an ap-
propriate in-depth strategy. If in the previous entrance to a depth,
the quality of the solution improves, again the same in-depth strat-
egy will be selected. Otherwise, another strategy will be chosen.
In each iteration, if a new solution is accepted, its characteris-
tics are saved in the “Best-solution matrix” and its objective func-
tion is saved in ξ variable. The history of accepted solution set is
saved in a matrix which is named “Elite matrix”. The algorithm
will benefit from this matrix in policy II. In Elite matrix, for the
accepted solution set, the number of presences of each facility at a
non-zero interdiction level is counted. Hence, in each iteration of
this policy, Elite matrix must be updated. In Fig. 4, an example of
updating Elite matrix in an iteration of the algorithm is presented.
In the new improved solution, facilities 2, 5 and 6 are interdicted
at non-zero levels, thus, in the new Elite matrix, their correspond-
ing values increase by one unit.
The algorithm takes advantage of a long-term memory for
recognition of repetitious solutions and in order to decrease the
processing time, CPLEX is only called for new interdiction patterns.
Finally, when the number of total unimproved iteration reaches
its stop criterion (e1), this policy is terminated.
5.2.3. Policy II: diversification
Local search methods can get stuck in local optima, where no
improving neighbors are available. Hence, in this policy, the algo-
rithm tries to diversify the attributes of improved solutions which
were saved in Elite matrix. Since the learning procedure (see,
Section 5.2.2) tries to intensifies the high-quality solutions, in pol-
icy II the depths are not chosen according to it. In this policy, the
depths for constructing neighbor solutions are chosen in sequence.
In each entrance to policy II, only one iteration is run and a short-
term memory containing the number of pervious chosen depth is
used to choose a new depth in the subsequent entrance.
Unlike policy I, in this policy, the chosen in-depth strategy
tends to solution perturbation through decreasing the interdiction
levels of those facilities with high respective values in Elite matrix
and increasing the interdiction levels of those facilities with low
respective values in the that matrix.
In each entrance to policy II, only one iteration is run and the
solution is accepted unless it is considered as a repetitious one.
Afterwards, the algorithm enters to policy III..2.4. Policy III: modified neighborhood search
The description of the operators and the details of policy III are
imilar to which already explained in Section 5.2.2 except for the
cceptance criterion for a created solution and the termination cri-
eria.
To propel the search procedure into a modified neighborhood,
he acceptance of a new solution even when its respective objec-
ive function is worse than the best solution (ξ ) under a specific
ondition is allowed. This condition is that the distance between
bjective function of a worse solution and ξ does not exceed an
llowable threshold (g).
In each entrance to policy III, with an increase in the number
f iterations, this allowable threshold gradually decreases. The goal
f considering a larger allowable threshold in initial iterations is to
ccelerate the procedure of escaping from local optima. However,
n last iterations the concentration of this search policy centered
pon improving the quality of the solutions. Eq. (24) shows how
his adaptive threshold is calculated in each iteration of policy III.
n this relation, ω denotes the initial threshold and q denotes the
ounter of policy III. Note that in each entrance to policy III, q is
et to one.
= ω
q × 100 (24)
This policy is terminated if one of the termination criteria is
et. The first criterion is that in an iteration of this policy, the
istance between the objective function of the neighbor solution
nd ξ be more than the allowable threshold or the best-known
olution is improved. Under this condition, the algorithm enters to
olicy II. The second criterion is that the number of total unim-
roved iterations be equal to the stop criterion of the whole algo-
ithm (e2). Under this condition, the algorithm is terminated and
he best solution is reported.
. Enumeration solution procedure
We use an exhaustive enumeration method to find the optimal
olution of the proposed bi-level model. In this method, all inter-
iction patterns are produced and for each pattern, we use CPLEX
o solve the lower level problem. Finally, the optimal interdiction
attern is the solution which maximizes the objective function (1).
The following self-evident lemma is applied to reduce the num-
er of CPLEX’s calls:
emma. If the residual budget of an interdiction pattern is sufficient
or interdicting at least one non-interdicted facility or an interdicted
acility at a higher level, the interdiction pattern is considered as a
ominated solution and CPLEX is not called for this solution.
In large-scale real-world problems, enumerating all interdiction
atterns is inapplicable. Therefore, we develop a two-stage enu-
eration procedure to achieve high quality solutions within a lim-
ted time for computing.











































|S2| {4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14}
|S1| 1.5 × |S2|
|I| 5 × (|S1| + |S2|)
|K| {2, 3, 4}
BL 0.2 × |S1| × ϱ1 + 0.2 × |S2| × ϱ2
BM 0.4 × |S1| × ϱ1 + 0.4 × |S2| × ϱ2
BH 0.6 × |S1| × ϱ1 + 0.6 × |S2| × ϱ2
(ϱ1,ϱ2) (4000, 11000)
(R, L) (1000, 1500)
(xi ,yi); i ∈ I Ri = R × U(0, 1), θ i = 2π × U(0, 1); xi = Ricos θ i , yi = Risin θ i
(xj ,yj); j ∈ S1 x j = −0.5L × L|S1 | × U(0, |S1|); yj = −0.5L × L|S1 | × U(0, |S1|)
(xj ,yj); j ∈ S2 x j = −0.5L × L|S2 | × U(0, |S2|); yj = −0.5L × L|S2 | × U(0, |S2|)
zi U(1000, 2000)
(θ , σ ) (0.7, 0.1)
c1
j
θ×∑i∈I zi|S1 |+|S2 | + U(0, 0.15 × [
θ×∑i∈I zi|S1 |+|S2 | ])
c2
j
σ×θ×∑i∈I zi+θ×∑i∈I zi|S2 | + U(0, 0.15 × [

















(α, β , γ ) (1, 2, 3)




































.1. Stage I: ordinary enumeration
The goal of this stage is to generate as much as interdiction pat-
erns as possible and this stage of the algorithm does not give any
riority to any specific interdiction patterns. The termination crite-
ia for this stage are (1) to reach the time limit (stage I time limit)
r (2) to enumerate all non-dominated patterns. If the first crite-
ion is met, this stage is terminated and the algorithm proceeds by
unning the second stage. If the second criterion is met, the whole
numeration algorithm is terminated and the optimal solution is
eported.
.2. Stage II: modified enumeration
At first, the best solutions achieved by applying the first stage
f the enumeration algorithm and the heuristic procedure are
dentified and the best one is selected as the input of the second
tage. Following this step, we use a heuristic approach to improve
he quality of the best-known solution. Essentially, for the selected
olution, the interdiction levels of several facilities are fixed and
or other facilities different interdiction patterns are enumerated.
or this purpose, reverse interdiction problem and the attributes
f the best solution are taken into consideration. The interdiction
evels of two kinds of facilities are considered as the fixed ones:
• Fixed at level 0: the facilities which are not interdicted at the
best-known solution and their respective Gj is equal to 2 in the
reverse interdiction problem, i.e. are submitted completely un-
der the both agreed prices (B′).
• Fixed at the maximum level: the set of facilities which are
interdicted at the maximum level in the best-known solution
with low respective Gj in reverse interdiction problem are iden-
tified. As much as 50% percent of the available interdiction bud-
get (B) assigns to full interdiction of those facilities which are
chosen randomly from this facility set. The stopping criteria of
this stage are to reach the time limit (stage II time limit) or
enumerating all interdiction patterns for the non-fixed facilities.
If one of the stopping criteria of this stage is met the enumer-
ation algorithm is terminated and the best solution is reported.
. Computational experiments
In this section, firstly the data structure for computational ex-
eriments is introduced and through analyzing the results of 18
ample data, the parameters of the algorithms are set. Next, in or-
er to investigate the performance of the heuristic and the enu-
eration algorithm, they are tested on 54 further instances. More-
ver, the behavior of the proposed bi-level model is analyzed and
o prove the effectiveness of this model, a computational test is
onducted on 21 instances for which the optimal solutions are
vailable.
The introduced algorithms have been coded in C++ and com-
iled with Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. Moreover, to solve the
ower level problem, ILOG CPLEX 12.3 is used. All proposed algo-
ithms are tested on a 32-bit computer benefits from Intel Core i7
.93 processor and 3.49 GB of RAM.
.1. Random data generation
The generated instances are categorized in six series according
o the number of facilities. In particular, in each series, the struc-
ure of data is the same and only the number of interdiction lev-
ls and the interdiction budget are different from each other. Fi-
ally, each series consists of nine instances leading to 54 instances.
able 1, reports the details for generating the instances.
In each series, for three instances, only full interdiction is al-
owed, thus two interdiction levels, i.e. full interdiction (level 1)nd no interdiction (level 0) are considered. While for other in-
tances, partial interdiction is allowed as well. Thus, for instances
aving three interdiction levels, the whole capacity of a facility is
ost when it is interdicted at level 2, and half of its capacity is lost
hen it is interdicted at level 1 and no interdiction is shown with
evel 0. Analogously, when there are four interdiction levels, lev-
ls 3 and 0 show full interdiction and no interdiction, respectively.
ore precisely, levels 2 and 1 indicate 33% and 66% capacity loss,
espectively.
Three different levels for available interdiction budget are con-
idered. BL shows the lowest level and the available budget in this
evel is sufficient for full interdiction of around 20% of facilities at
evel I and II. While BM and BH indicate medium and the high-
st level of available budget which is sufficient for full interdiction
f around 40% and 60% of facilities of each level, respectively. In
able 1, ϱ1 and ϱ2 show the required budget for full interdiction of
ach facility at level I and II, respectively.
We benefit from the approach which is applied in Church et al.
2004) to identify the coordinates (x, y) of the customers and the
acilities in each data series. The customers are uniformly dis-
ersed on a circular area with radius (R) equal to 1000 which is
entered at the origin (0,0). Those facilities at levels I and II are
niformly distributed on several imaginary equidistant vertical and
orizontal lines. The number of these lines for the facilities at level
is |S1| + 1 and for the facilities at level II is |S2| + 1 and these
maginary lines dice a square centered at the origin (0,0) with a
ength (L) of 1500.
Each instance is made of a unique combination of three inde-
endent parameters (i.e., the number of facilities at level II, the
evel of available budget and the number of interdiction intensity
evels) thus 6 × 3 × 3 = 54 different instances can be generated. The
ain characteristic of each series is the number of its upper level
nd lower level facilities and the number of customers are pro-
ortional to it. For series one to six, the numbers of upper level
acilities are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14, respectively.
.2. Parameter setting
The most influential parameters of the heuristic algorithm are
1) e1: stop criterion of policy, (2) e2: stop criterion of the whole
lgorithm, and 3) ω: initial allowable threshold. Table 2, gives the
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Table 2
Parameter tuning.
Parameters Different Tested values Selected value
e1 {2, 5} × (|S1| + |S2|) 5
e2 {8, 10, 12, 14} × (|S1| + |S2|) 8
ω {10%, 50%} 10%
Table 3
Performance of FDS with regard to the structure of its initial solution.
CS1 CS2 FDS (CS1) FDS (CS2)
Series Time GAP% Time GAP% Time GAP% Time GAP%
1 0.05 6.00 0.09 4.55 17.87 0.00 13.85 0.00
2 0.09 5.98 0.17 5.30 38.64 0.00 34.51 0.00
3 0.15 7.46 0.26 5.39 89.99 0.20 77.72 0.16
4 0.22 7.34 0.43 5.76 176.3 0.21 151.6 0.11
5 0.30 11.43 0.56 7.48 265.0 0.68 241.5 0.46
6 0.40 8.06 0.71 5.88 424.8 0.81 413.2 0.38
Avg. 0.20 7.71 0.37 5.73 168.7 0.32 155.4 0.19
Table 4
Performance of the learning procedure.
With Learning Without Learning
Series Time GAP% Time GAP%
1 13.85 0.00 14.88 0.04
2 34.51 0.00 37.40 0.01
3 77.72 0.16 88.19 0.06
4 151.63 0.11 159.15 1.38
5 241.56 0.46 244.52 1.38
6 413.16 0.38 473.05 0.50





















different tested values and the corresponding selected ones for
each of these parameters. To select the best values of the main
parameters in the heuristic algorithm, all 16 possible combinations
of these parameters are tested on 18 sample instances. Thereupon,
non-parametric Friedman test with p-value equal to 0.05 is used to
compare the performance of each parameter combination. The test
shows that there is no meaningful difference among the perfor-
mance of these 16 parameter combinations. Thus, the combination
which results in the least average running time is selected.
7.3. Computational results of the solution methods
In this section, to obtain the definitive structure of the enumer-
ation algorithm and heuristic algorithm, computational results in
both the absence and the presence of their crucial operators are
analyzed. Subsequently, a comparison between the definitive struc-
ture of the heuristic and the enumeration procedures is drawn and
the stability of the heuristic procedure is tested.
7.3.1. Identifying the enumeration algorithm structure
In comprehensive enumeration, all interdiction patterns are
produced and for each pattern, CPLEX is called to solve the lower
level problem. The number of interdiction patterns depends on the
number of facilities in level I and II and the number of interdiction
intensity levels. For example, in the largest problem size with 21
and 14 facilities for level I and II, respectively, and 4 interdiction
intensity levels, there are 435 combinations for interdiction that
need a huge amount of time to be solved. Hence we considered
25 and 5 h time limit for stage I and stage II of the enumeration
algorithm, respectively, in order to ensure getting high quality so-
lutions for evaluation the proposed heuristic method.
Within the time limit of stage I of the enumeration algorithm
for the instances of series 1 and 2 and instances 19, 20, 21 the op-
timal solutions are obtained. Thus, the second stage of the enumer-
ation algorithm is not executed for these instances. For the large-
scale instances, i.e. instances 22 to 54 in which their optimal so-
lutions are not obtained, it is seen that the average improvement
in the objective function after running the modified enumeration
stage is 2.44%. In Fig. 5, this considerable improvement is shown.Fig. 5. Percentage improvement in stageence, in the rest of the paper, for the computational analysis, both
f these stages are inserted in the definitive structure of the enu-
eration algorithm. The solution which is obtained through this
lgorithm is called as “BNS” (Best Known Solution) and the solu-
ion of the FDS algorithm is saved in . Hence, the differences
etween the objective functions of these two algorithms can be
alculated through % = BNS−BNS × 100 .
.3.2. Performance of the constructive algorithms
In Table 3, the performance of the FDS algorithm is evaluated
ith regard to the initial solutions which are obtained through the
rst and the second constructive algorithms and the corresponding
esults are reported, respectively, in the columns labeled by “FDS
CS1)” and “FDS (CS2)”. For each constructive algorithm or the FDS
lgorithm, the columns labeled by “Time” and “GAP%” show, re-
pectively, the average CPU running time (in second) and average
ap between BNS and the solution obtained by the corresponding
lgorithm.
According to Table 4, CS2 algorithm is superior to CS1 algorithm
nd its average gaps over the six series are, respectively, around 2%
nd 0.13% less than the CS1, for the initial and the last obtained
olutions. In addition, the difference between their running time
s insignificant for initial solutions while the FDS algorithm whenII of the enumeration algorithm.
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Table 5
Performance of diversification procedure.
With diversification Without diversification
Series Time GAP% Time GAP%
1 13.85 0.00 4.80 0.00
2 34.51 0.00 10.27 0.00
3 77.72 0.16 27.99 0.20
4 151.63 0.11 50.06 0.21
5 241.56 0.46 90.64 0.68
6 413.16 0.38 195.09 0.81
Avg. 155.40 0.19 63.14 0.32
Table 6
Stability of the FDS algorithm.
GAP%
Series Avg. Time Best Avg. Worst Std.
1 14.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 35.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 82.14 0.00 0.1 0.26 0.12
4 146.78 0.02 0.14 0.3 0.14
5 251.7 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.01
6 426.24 0.04 0.17 0.47 0.22

































The effect of interdiction budget on the selected interdiction pattern.
Low (Budget) Medium (Budget) High (Budget)
Series LLF ULF LLF ULF LLF ULF
1 100% 0% 95% 5% 19% 81%
2 100% 0% 5% 95% 8% 92%
3 100% 0% 9% 91% 3% 97%
4 100% 0% 2% 98% 9% 91%
5 100% 0% 5% 95% 0% 100%
6 100% 0% 2% 98% 3% 97%
Avg. 100% 0% 20% 80% 7% 93%
Table 8
Effect of partial interdiction on total budget consumption.













































tarts from the initial solution obtained through CS2 algorithm is
round 13 s faster in average. Thus, in the rest of this section, we
enefit from the second constructive algorithm to obtain the initial
olutions.
.3.3. Performance of learning procedure
Through using the long-term memory, the probability of select-
ng a depth is affected by the performance of each depth in pervi-
us iterations while in the absence of the learning procedure the
lgorithm selects each depth with the same probability. The com-
utational results of the heuristic algorithm with and without ap-
lying the learning procedure are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 demonstrates that through applying the learning proce-
ure the running time and the gap are improved around 14 s and
.37%, respectively. Thus, in rest of this section, the learning proce-
ure is inserted in the structure of the FDS algorithm
.3.4. Performance of the diversification procedure
Table 5 draws a comparison between the performance of the
lgorithm in both absence and the presence of the diversification
rocedure. It is observed that the diversification procedure im-
roves the average running time by around 92 s and decreases the
ap by 0.13%. Hence, the advantage of the diversification in term of
oth running time and quality of the solutions is verified. In this
ection, for the rest of computational analysis, diversification pro-
edure is inserted in the FDS.
.3.5. Stability of the heuristic algorithm
Since the developed FDS algorithm contains randomness, we
erform a test to assess the impact of that over different runs of
he algorithm. To do so, for each instance we run the algorithm
our times and the results are summarized in Table 6. In this ta-
le, the columns which are labeled by “Best”, “Avg.” and “Worst”
how, respectively the least, average and the worst gaps in the in-
tances of each series, respectively. Moreover, the last column gives
he standard deviation of the results for the instances in each se-
ies of data. The computational results clearly indicate the effec-
iveness and stability of FDS algorithm..4. Analyzing the behavior of the model
In each series of the generated instances, the number of cus-
omers and their demand, the number of facilities in each hierar-
hy and the coordinates of facilities and customers are the same.
his integrated structure provides an appropriate framework to
est the behavior of the proposed model in term of different num-
er of interdiction intensity levels and available interdiction bud-
et. In particular, to investigate the relation between the level of
nterdiction budget and its contribution toward the interdiction of
ach hierarchy, some results are reported in Table 7.
The instances of each series are categorized into three groups
ccording to their available budget; i.e., Low, Medium and High.
he columns which are labeled by “LLF” and “ULF” show the per-
entage of the available interdiction budget which is allocated to
he interdiction of facilities at levels I and II, respectively. The com-
utational results demonstrate that when the level of interdiction
udget is low, the interdictor allocates her total budget to interdic-
ion of the facilities at level I while when the level of her available
udget is high; she prefers to allocate the most of her budget to
nterdiction of the facilities at level II. When the level of available
nterdiction budget is medium, the behavior of the model is not
uch clear but for most instances the interdictor prefers to allocate
he biggest share of her available budget to interdiction of the fa-
ilities at level II.
As described in the definition of the problem, the interdictor
s allowed to partially interdict the capacity of different facilities.
o test the advantages of this assumption, some computational re-
ults are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 shows the relation
etween the percentage of the total consumed interdiction budget
nd the type of interdiction problem, i.e., full or partial interdic-
ion. The results demonstrate that when the interdictor can inter-
ict facilities partially with four intensity levels, she can consume
9% of her available budget while in full interdiction only 95% of
otal budget can be consumed.
Table 9 shows the effect of considering different interdiction in-
ensity levels on the quality of the selected interdiction pattern. For
his purpose, the instances of each series are categorized in three
ew groups with respect to their level of available budget. Subse-
uently, for each category the objective function of the most de-
tructive interdiction pattern is reported in “ObjPattern”. Each col-
mn which is labeled by “2Int”, “3Int” and “4Int” indicates the av-
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Table 9
Effect of partial interdiction on destruction’s depth of the selected interdiction
pattern.
Avg. GAP%
Series Budget level ObjPattern 2Int 3Int 4Int
Series
1
Low 50,057,971 3.75% 3.75% 0.00%
Medium 65,396,518 1.28% 1.28% 0.00%
High 82,170,452 5.05% 0.55% 0.00%
Average: 3.36% 1.86% 0.00%
Series
2
Low 55,178,155 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Medium 83,935,997 6.26% 0.19% 0.00%
High 117,030,188 2.39% 0.00% 0.80%
Average: 2.88% 0.06% 0.27%
Series
3
Low 71,814,134 5.18% 1.32% 0.00%
Medium 108,598,952 3.90% 0.95% 0.00%
High 153,564,778 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average: 3.03% 0.76% 0.00%
Series
4
Low 89,562,255 3.28% 0.00% 1.12%
Medium 136,730,099 2.04% 0.00% 0.69%
High 188,721,011 1.69% 0.34% 0.00%
Average: 2.34% 0.11% 0.60%
Series
5
Low 101,116,986 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Medium 169,931,546 2.72% 2.72% 0.00%
High 238,743,348 0.82% 0.82% 0.00%
Average: 1.18% 1.18% 0.00%
Series
6
Low 264,965,454 1.88% 0.52% 0.00%
Medium 179,452,683 2.34% 0.50% 0.00%
High 107,266,139 3.83% 0.98% 0.00%
Average: 2.68% 0.67% 0.00%

































erage difference between ObjPattern and the objective function of
instances which have 2, 3 and 4 interdiction levels, respectively.
For all data series, the average gap between the objective func-
tion of the most destructive interdiction pattern and the objec-
tive function of full interdiction is 2.58%, while for partial inter-
diction with 3 and 4 interdiction levels are 0.77% and 0.15%, re-
spectively. Based on the results reported in Tables 8 and 9, partial
interdiction results in more interdiction budget consumption and
destructive interdiction pattern. Thus, in real-world problem most
interdiction plans are benefit from partial interdiction versus fullinterdiction.
Table 10
Investigating the ability of the model in cost re
Cost
instance Time With model Withou
1 1.45 48,180,522 51,023
2 4.46 64,561,039 76,706
3 3.6 78,017,592 87,274
4 8.01 48,180,522 51,023
5 15.51 64,561,039 68,081
6 12.87 81,722,572 84,658
7 16.5 50,057,971 52,923
8 40.54 65,396,518 68,085
9 21.67 82,170,452 87,510
10 8.01 55,178,155 60,617
11 11.14 78,681,472 92,076
12 9.73 114,234,601 117,19
13 23.17 55,178,155 60,617
14 31.25 83,774,576 95,932
15 33.07 117,030,188 119,62
16 53.98 55,178,155 60,617
17 61.57 83,935,997 95,695
18 78.63 116,093,638 118,69
19 25.32 68,091,476 74,219
20 23.21 104,354,247 126,27
21 24.54 153,564,778 163,49
Average cost reduction:.5. Investigating the effectiveness of the proposed model
In this paper, the main research question is “how much the pro-
osed model can decrease the cost of this hierarchal service sys-
em?” and this section aims to answer it through a comparison
etween the computational results of this problem in both pres-
nce and absence of the bi-level model. In the absence of the pro-
osed model, the system defender does not take the vulnerability
f the facilities into consideration in the designing phase and no
eassignment strategy is possible. Thus, when the system is faced
ith interdiction and some customers lose their pervious service
evel, only outsourcing option is available. To solve the test prob-
ems under this assumption, the following steps are done:
Step 1:
Set xjk = 1 for all facilities at interdiction level k = 0 and xjk = 0
or other interdiction levels. Subsequently, solve the follower level









Solve the bi-level model and obtain the most destructive inter-
iction pattern.
Step 3:
Fix the interdiction variables equal to the most destructive in-
erdiction pattern. Moreover, for each facility, set the upper bound







. Subsequently, solve the lower level problem and report the ob-
ective function.
Among the six series of data which are solved through the
numeration algorithm, only for the first 21 instances the opti-
al solutions are obtained. Thus, the first 21 instances are solved
n two ways; i.e., (1) through the above-mentioned steps, and (2)
he proposed bi-level model. Computational results are reported in
able 10. The two columns labeled by “Cost” demonstrate the in-
urred cost to the service system, respectively, through applying
he first and the second ways and the last two columns labeled by
Improvement” show respectively, the amount and the percentage
f cost reduction through applying the proposed bi-level model.
he “Time” column corresponds to the time required for solving
he bi-level model in each instance. The results indicate that the
roposed model is able to decrease the cost of customers’ demand
atisfaction around 7.94% on average.duction.
Improvement






































































































. Conclusion and further research
The purpose of this paper is to obtain an appropriate demand
atisfaction pattern for hierarchical service facilities which face ca-
acity lost due to partial interdiction. To formulate this problem a
ixed-integer bi-level model is proposed. In the upper level prob-
em, the interdictor chooses the most destructive interdiction pat-
ern with regard to her available interdiction budget. Subsequently,
n the lower level problem, the defender tries to minimize the to-
al cost of demand satisfaction for all customers through benefiting
rom outsourcing and allocating the customers to the facilities with
egard to their available capacity. The proposed model is a benefi-
ial one for service facilities which face planned disasters and the
efender should react intelligently and fast in order to incur the
east possible cost to satisfy all customer demand.
To solve this problem, an enumeration procedure and a heuris-
ic method are proposed. To speed up the enumeration proce-
ure, in addition to ordinary enumeration, we proposed a mod-
fied enumeration stage. The computational results show that this
xtra stage is able to improve the solutions by around 3%. This pro-
osed algorithm is not however a suitable one for large-scale real-
orld problems. We, therefore, develop a heuristic algorithm based
n local search. To analyze the effectiveness of the proposed algo-
ithms, several computational tests are conducted. Through these
ests, firstly, the best possible structure for each algorithm is iden-
ified. Next, the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithm is verified
nd the behavior of partial interdiction model versus full interdic-
ion model is analyzed. The results demonstrate that partial inter-
iction model through adding more flexibility in the process of se-
ecting the most destructive interdiction pattern is more viable for
nterdictors. Thus, considering partial interdiction assist the pro-
osed model to be more in touch with reality. Finally, the effec-
iveness of the proposed model is tested through comparing the
omputational results of handling the interdiction in both absence
nd presence of the proposed model. The findings also illustrate
hat this model is able to decrease the average cost of customers’
emand satisfaction by around 7.94% for the instances with avail-
ble optimal solutions.
This paper opens a new perspective for future studies in both
ilitary and non-military spheres, and many extensions can be
onsidered for the proposed problem. Several examples are as fol-
ows:
• Consider the horizontal relations in addition to hierarchical re-
lations among the facilities. For instance, “Goods sharing” strat-
egy (see Azad et al., 2013) could be applied by using the excess
commodity in a facility in the same service hierarchy to fulfill
the demand at the interdicted facility,
• Develop a tri-level model to locate the hierarchal facilities in
the system and identity appropriate capacities for them,
• Consider uncertainty in parameters of the model,
• Assume capacity expansion possibilities in the problem and ex-
tending the model as a multi-objective one,
• Consider reduction in the reliability and availability of the facil-
ities as the potential outcomes of interdiction,
• Assume asymmetry in information sharing between the inter-
dictor and the defender. Since in real-world problems the play-
ers try to hide their offensive and defensive strategies, this as-
sumption is more in touch with reality.
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